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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 When that first hook from Ice Ice Baby comes over the speakers, it 
is unmistakable for almost an entire generation. Those first few 
notes (dingdingding duhdah dingding . . . ) immediately cause many 
folks to “stop, collaborate, and listen.”1 The problem with identifying 
those sounds with Vanilla Ice is that they were not created by him or 
his discjockey (DJ), but rather by David Bowie and Queen in their 
song Under Pressure.2 The Ice Ice Baby versus Under Pressure com-
                                                                                                                      
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Florida State University College of Law; B.B.A., Mar-
keting and B.S., Religion, The College of William & Mary. I would like to thank my wife, 
Crysie, for her support and for reading this piece for many, many hours.  Special thanks to 
Barbara Chrisman for her diligence and professionalism, Jennifer Shelfer for her superb 
editorial work and suggestions, and the entire Florida State University Law Review for its 
hard work.  All errors within are my own. 
 1. VANILLA ICE, Ice Ice Baby, on TO THE EXTREME (Capitol Records 1990). 
 2. QUEEN, Under Pressure, on LIVE MAGIC (Hollywood Records 1986). Under Pres-
sure was written as a collaboration by Queen and David Bowie. Vanilla Ice used the sam-
ple without permission, Dean Kuipers, Vanilla Ice Returns Buff but Still Bland; Gangsta 
Lyrics Aside, the Rapper Needs More Originality to Rise Above His Catchy 1990 Hit, L.A. 
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2004, at E23, and lost his royalties to Queen and David Bowie, Ben Chal-
lis, The Song Remains the Same: A Review of the Legalities of Music Sampling, Dec. 23, 
2003, http:// www.mondaq.com/i_article.asp?articleid=23823&print=1. 
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parison is an example of digital sampling and the confusion it poten-
tially causes.  
 Artists, typically in the rap and hip-hop genres, often utilize small 
portions of songs created by other artists. Digital technology provides 
artists with the ability to simply lift notes from a previously recorded 
song, modify them (or not), and place them into the background, bass 
line, or basic beat of a new song. This practice has uncovered a new 
set of issues within copyright law.  
 A sound recording is the audible song as performed by an artist. 
Sound recordings are copyrightable subject matter, with owners—
performing artists—having exclusive rights to reproduction and de-
rivative works.3 They are produced based on musical compositions, 
which include the written notes, words, and arrangements of a song. 
Musical compositions are copyrightable subject matter, with own-
ers—songwriters/composers—having exclusive rights.4 Digital sam-
pling has forced copyright law to specify whether using small por-
tions of a copyrighted musical work infringes on the exclusive rights 
of the owner(s). 
 There are three cardinal cases that have dealt with the issue of 
digital sampling in order to determine the appropriate rights for par-
ties on either side of the sample. These cases run the gamut in re-
gard to solving the issue using three different approaches: (1) calling 
digital sampling “stealing” and warranting criminal prosecution,5 (2) 
recognizing licenses as circumventing sound recording infringement 
but applying a substantial similarity analysis to musical composition 
infringement,6 and (3) calling samples “derivative works” and extend-
ing restrictions on pirating of whole works to the pirating of sam-
ples.7 
                                                                                                                      
 3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102, 114(b) (2000).  While copyrights are now attainable in sound 
recordings, this has not always been true.  In 1972, the Sound Recording Act of 1971 took 
effect, protecting sound recordings. While other tangible creative works, like musical com-
positions, were protected, sound recordings were vulnerable until the law began to catch 
up with advances in digital music technology. 
 4. Id. §§ 102, 106. 
 5. See Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 
183-85, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that Grand Upright Music owned valid copyrights in 
the sound recording and musical composition of Gilbert O’Sullivan’s Alone Again (Natu-
rally) and that Biz Markie’s unauthorized use of a sample of the song was a “callous disre-
gard for the law”). 
 6. See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1190, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding 
that the three-note sample used in the Beastie Boys song, Pass the Mic, was not a substan-
tial enough portion of the musical composition of James W. Newton’s Choir to constitute 
copyright infringement; since the Beastie Boys had obtained a license to use the sound re-
cording, only the musical composition copyright was at issue), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2905 
(2005). 
 7. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004) (hold-
ing that owners of rights in sound recording of George Clinton, Jr. and the Funkadelics’ 
Get Off Your Ass and Jam had the exclusive right to sample the sound recording and, as 
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 This confusing legal progression seems to be the result of a judi-
cial desire to provide some stability in a tumultuous music industry. 
To determine an efficient test or an efficient bright-line rule in re-
gard to the copyright issues created by digital sampling—rather than 
a quick fix—a law-and-economics analysis provides a great deal of 
insight. Should compulsory licensing solve the problem? Should li-
censing and licensing fees be based on bargaining, rather than statu-
tory requirements? Should fines be used to ensure the integrity of a 
bargaining process? Should digital sampling, without permission or 
licensing, warrant criminal prosecution? Even though Vanilla Ice 
claimed “if there was a problem, yo, I’ll solve it,”8 perhaps a law-and-
economics analysis is more reliable for a music industry practice that 
is under pressure. 
 In this Comment, Part II surveys the copyright law concepts in-
volved in digital sampling. Part III details the environment in the 
music industry as it exists today—including more detailed informa-
tion on digital sampling, an explanation of compulsory licensing, and 
a discussion of the leading cases in digital sampling. In addition, 
Part III differentiates the issues created by digital sampling of sound 
recordings versus musical compositions. Part IV offers an economic 
analysis of the digital sampling issue—including analysis of copy-
right law, digital sampling rules created by the dispositive cases, and 
potential resolutions for courts facing digital sampling disputes. Part 
V concludes the Comment.  
II.   COPYRIGHT LAW: THE PRELUDE 
 Digital sampling is just one example of a practice that affects the 
continuously evolving area of copyright law. As technology continues 
to expand the limits of expressive capabilities, as well as reproduc-
tion capabilities, copyright law must adapt in order to adequately 
protect original works fixed in a tangible medium.9  
 According to the Copyright Act, the law protects “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”10 Significant 
to the music industry, musical works such as accompanying words 
(musical compositions) and sound recordings are included in the list 
of “works of authorship.”11 The difference between musical composi-
tions and sound recordings is discussed in Part III.A, infra. The 
                                                                                                                      
such, a substantial similarity analysis was not required to prove copyright infringement on 
the part of No Limit Films), amended by 401 F.3d 647 (6th Cir. 2004) (granting rehearing 
en banc on section II of opinion). 
 8. VANILLA ICE, supra note 1. 
 9. See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 319 (3d ed. 2003). 
 10. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 11. Id. 
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Copyright Act affords certain exclusive rights to the owners of a 
copyright—including the rights to make copies, to prepare derivative 
works, to control the sale and distribution of the work, to control the 
sale and distribution of any copies or derivative works, and to control 
the public performance or display of the work(s).12  
 These exclusive rights are the basis for the litigation that has 
arisen in the music business regarding digital downloading (copying 
and distribution) and, critical to this Comment, digital sampling 
(copying and derivative works). The exclusive rights are also limited 
by three doctrines that are especially important in the music indus-
try: (1) fair use, (2) first use, and (3) first sale. The fair use doctrine 
grants the limited use of copyrighted works based on a balancing 
test. This test looks at the purpose and character of the use of the 
copyrighted work (must be transformative and noncommercial), the 
nature of the copyrighted work (more creative works get greater pro-
tection), the portion of copyrighted work used, and the effect of the 
use of the copyrighted work on the market.13 Fair use could apply to 
digital sampling, depending on how a court analyzes sampling under 
the fair use criteria listed in the statute.14 In contrast, the first use 
doctrine, which is particular to the music business, requires the 
owner of a musical composition copyright to license its use to anyone 
who wants it;15 this is also known as the compulsory license, dis-
cussed in Part III.B, infra. The first sale doctrine permits the owner 
of a lawfully obtained copy of a work to sell or dispose of the work 
without the permission of the copyright owner.16 This plays out in 
digital sampling when courts must determine whether a sampling 
artist has infringed on an owner’s rights, since a lawfully obtained li-
cense to use a sound recording or musical composition permits sam-
pling. 
III.   THE MUSIC BIZ: WHAT’S GOIN’ ON 
 In order to understand why digital sampling and the rules sur-
rounding it are of any concern, one must understand it and the envi-
ronment in which it exists. Digital sampling, for the purposes of this 
Comment, is a term taken from the music industry. The music indus-
                                                                                                                      
 12. MERGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 323-24. 
 13. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 
1014 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 350-51 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 14. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). Balancing the four fair use factors allows courts to 
avoid an application of copyright law that would stifle creativity.  See Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817-18 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books 
USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1997)). 
 15. 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1) (2000). 
 16. Id. § 109(a). This statute is what allows used CD stores and video rental stores to 
lawfully exist. 
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try has been shaken up quite a bit lately due to the rise of internet 
technologies that have made “sharing” music much easier. In addi-
tion, recording companies have steadily lost money,17 forcing com-
pany reductions and industry consolidations.18 The emergence of 
digital downloading brought about a great deal of litigation centered 
on the exclusive rights of artists, songwriters, and record companies 
in copyrighted songs.19 The details of these cases, while interesting, 
are not of concern for the purpose of this Comment. It is the impact 
of these cases that is of much greater importance. The digital 
download or music piracy (depending on your biases) cases bring 
critical sound recording and musical composition copyright issues 
into light. The courts have said that it is illegal to make songs avail-
able online without permission.20 In addition, record companies have 
responded with a digital-age strategy making piracy more difficult 
and undesirable through tactics like spoofing,21 launching campaigns 
to warn consumers that piracy is stealing, and moving toward au-
thorized online distribution of songs.22  
 All of these steps are evidence that the copyright owners and the 
courts take very seriously the exclusive rights afforded those who 
create sound recordings and musical compositions. While the techni-
cal details of an internet application can possibly change an out-
                                                                                                                      
 17. In addition to legal battles involving digital downloading, there has been a steady 
reduction in CD shipments from 2000 to 2003. See Recording Indus. Assoc. of Am., 2003 
Yearend Statistics, available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/pdf/ 
2003yearEnd.pdf (last visited Jun. 15, 2005); RIAA Announces 2003 Year-End Shipment 
Numbers, (Mar. 4, 2004), available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/030404.asp. 
Coincidentally, or not, the decline in sales began the same year that Napster came online. 
 18. The disruption in the music business has also caused massive layoffs by major la-
bels. See, e.g., Ethan Smith, Universal Music to Cut Work Force as Industry Sags, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 16, 2003, at A3; Sony Music to Cut 1,000 Jobs as Part of a Vast Restructuring, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2003, at B2.  It has also caused the merger of two labels, Sony and 
BMG. See U.S. Agency Clears Sony-BMG Music Merger, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2004, at C5.  
 19. The music business has been plagued with issues related to the illegal use or dis-
tribution of songs. Digital downloading/music piracy was brought into question in several 
cases. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th 
Cir. 2004); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2000). These cases have hinged upon the al-
leged infringer’s contribution to third-party infringement and their ability to supervise and 
prohibit the activity of the third-party infringers.  
 20. The courts in A&M Records and UMG Recordings found the providers to have in-
fringed on the copyrights of the recording companies. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit did 
not find that Grokster had the requisite knowledge of or control over third-party infringe-
ment to constitute vicarious or contributory infringement.  Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1163.  
However, the United States Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s de-
cision based on evidence of Grokster’s active inducement of third-party infringement. 
 21. DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC BUSINESS 375 
(5th ed. 2003).  Record companies will loop a small portion of a popular song, download it, 
and then post thousands of copies of this looped version so that downloaders end up with it 
rather than the real recording. This practice is known as spoofing.  Id. 
 22. See id. at 376. 
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come,23 the basic idea is that songs cannot be distributed without 
permission. The question that digital sampling raises is, What about 
small portions of a song distributed in a completely new copyright-
able work?   
A.   Sound Recordings v. Musical Compositions 
 When dealing with copyright issues in the music business, the dis-
tinction between a sound recording and a musical composition must 
be understood. A sound recording is the actual recorded version of a 
song; it is the artist’s individual expression of a song through in-
struments and voice.24 A musical composition, on the other hand, in-
cludes the notes, arrangement (sheet music), and lyrics of a song.25 
Given that these are two distinct facets of an original musical work, 
there are different copyright protections for each.  
 Prior to 1972 and the enactment of the Sound Recording Act of 
1971, sound recordings received no copyright protection.26 The pro-
tections now afforded to sound recordings relate to the artist’s indi-
vidual expression in the song performance. Owners of sound re-
cording copyrights cannot prevent others from recording the same 
song but can prevent the copying and distribution of their original 
recording.27 
 Under copyright law, musical compositions have always been con-
sidered musical works and protected in the same way as a play or 
short story.28 Copyright law prohibits others from copying and using 
the lyrics or the sheet music of a song in any way. Given this broad 
range of protection for musical compositions, they are subject to com-
pulsory licensing.29 The compulsory license forces the musical compo-
sition copyright holder to allow anyone to use the work as long as he 
or she pays for it.30 There is a statutory cap on the fee for the use, 
which can be and is often negotiated down. There is no such compul-
sory license for sound recordings.31 As discussed in Part III.D, infra, 
the courts have had to deal with both of the different copyrights in 
determining how digital sampling does or does not infringe on a 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights.  
                                                                                                                      
 23. Napster technology actually included a Napster-owned server, housing all the 
copyrighted works, while Grokster technology did not rely on a central server to store 
songs for download. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012; Grokster, 380 F.3d at 1158. 
 24. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 9, at 371. 
 25. See id. 
 26. Id. at 372. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 371. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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B.   The Compulsory License: What, Why, and How Much? 
 As discussed in Part III.A, supra, the compulsory license is an ex-
ception to the exclusive rights of a musical composition copyright 
holder. There are several kinds of compulsory licenses, but for the 
purposes of this Comment, we are only concerned with the compul-
sory license in phonorecords32 of nondramatic musical compositions.33 
 The compulsory license in phonorecords of nondramatic musical 
compositions is known as a compulsory mechanical license in the 
music industry.34 As mentioned in Part III.A, supra, compulsory me-
chanical licenses only apply to musical compositions. Based on sec-
tion 115 of the Copyright Act, once a song has been recorded, who-
ever owns the copyright is required to license it to whomever else 
wants to use it in a phonorecord, as long as the new user pays a 
capped statutory fee.35 In order to obtain a compulsory license, the 
song must be (1) a nondramatic musical work, (2) previously re-
corded, (3) distributed publicly in phonorecords, and (4) for use only 
in phonorecords.36 
 Congress created the compulsory mechanical license to prevent 
the music industry from establishing a monopoly on musical works.37 
In addition, to control the fee for the compulsory mechanical license, 
Congress created the statutory rate. The rate establishes a cap for 
the fee charged by copyright owners for the use of their musical com-
position. As of January 1, 2006, the rate is 9.1 cents for a song five 
minutes long or shorter, with a rate of 1.75 cents per minute or frac-
tion of a minute above five minutes.38  
                                                                                                                      
 32. The Copyright Act defines phonorecords as:  
[M]aterial objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later 
developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced or other-
wise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device . . . 
“phonorecords” includes the material object in which the sounds are first fixed. 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000). 
 33. See id. § 115. 
 34. PASSMAN, supra note 21, at 197-98. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 198. 
 37. Id. at 197. 
 38. Id. at 199. For example, if an artist purchases the license to use a particular mu-
sical composition, every time a CD with a song using that copyrighted composition is made 
(not just sold, but made), the owner of the copyright gets paid. The owner gets 9.1 cents per 
CD if the song is five minutes or shorter. If the song is even a fraction over five minutes, 
the copyright owner gets an additional 1.75 cents (10.85 cents total) per CD. If the song is 
a fraction over six minutes, the copyright owner gets the 9.1 cents, plus the 1.75 cents for 
the additional minute, plus another 1.75 cents for the fraction over six minutes (12.6 cents 
total) per CD. Obviously, this adds up if a songwriter has multiple copyrighted songs on an 
artist’s album and that album is reproduced millions of times. 
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C.   Digital Sampling: What, Why, and How? 
 Sampling traces its roots back to Jamaica in the 1960s when art-
ists or DJs would “dub” records by mixing different reggae albums 
together, over which the artists would improvise lyrics.39 DJ Kool 
Herc, held by many as the grandfather of rap,40 brought “dub” to the 
Bronx, New York, from Jamaica in the 1970s.41 As local artists in 
New York began to mix disco, funk, and R&B records via turntables 
to create the background for their street lyrics, rap was born.42 In the 
mid-1980s, digital musical technology came onto the scene.  
 With the advent of the digital sampler, artists were able to make 
perfect digital copies of any sound or song they liked and then play or 
edit it through some other instrument or device. Entire sections of an 
existing sound recording could be extended or looped and placed into 
new songs to create beats and backgrounds without the use of turn-
tables and mixers.43 This practice has become very common in rap 
and hip-hop. In addition to the example from the Introduction, songs 
like Sugar Hill Gang’s Rapper’s Delight, M.C. Hammer’s You Can’t 
Touch This, and 2Pac’s Changes are examples of popular songs that 
have sampled other previously recorded popular songs.44 
 Although a few artists were concerned about the possibility of in-
fringements at the onset, sampling went on without much concern, 
for the most part, for the rights of the owners of the sampled re-
cording, and deals were struck only if artists were actually caught 
having sampled another’s work.45 The deals typically involved buying 
out the rights in the sampled sound recording owned by a record 
company and those rights in the musical composition owned by a 
publisher.46 The relaxed attitude toward sampling ended with the 
words of the Honorable Kevin Thomas Duffy, “Thou shalt not steal.”47 
 Digital sampling is obviously not practiced without reason. First, 
given the technology, it is easy to do. Sound recordings can be repro-
                                                                                                                      
 39. See Eric Shimanoff, The Odd Couple: Postmodern Culture and Copyright Law, 11 
MEDIA L. & POL’Y 12, 24-25 (2002). 
 40. Garage-Music.com, Reggae Music—What Does It Mean to House and Garage Mu-
sic, http://www.garage-music.com/reggae.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2006). 
 41. See Shimanoff, supra note 39, at 24-25. 
 42. See id. at 25. 
 43. See id. at 26-27. 
 44. Rapper’s Delight samples the disco hit Good Times by Chic. Id. at 25. You Can’t 
Touch This samples the funk hit Super Freak by Rick James.  Id. at 28. Changes samples 
the 1980s hit The Way It Is by Bruce Hornsby and the Range. Keith Harris, Rap in Peace, 
http://citypages.com/databank/21/998/article8376.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2006). 
 45. Id. at 27. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 183 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
2005]           LAW AND ECONOMICS ON DIGITAL SAMPLING 305 
 
duced as replays, which eliminate some of the copyright mess48 but 
require someone to actually play an instrument in the exact same 
way to recreate the desired sound. Second, sampling can be profit-
able. Creating replays costs money and takes time, but sampling can 
be done for free (absent some of the issues discussed in this Com-
ment) and take seconds. Most importantly, those who sample do so 
with the idea that the sampled material in the background will make 
their song better, resulting in greater popularity and higher sales.49 
D.   What Noise Have the Courts Brought? 
 There are three cases that define the landscape for digital sam-
pling law. Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records in-
volved a sample taken by the rapper Biz Markie without obtaining 
any permission.50 Newton v. Diamond involved a dispute over 
whether a sample taken by the rap group the Beastie Boys infringed 
upon another artist’s musical composition rights.51 In that case, the 
Beastie Boys had obtained a license to use the sound recording but 
not the musical composition.52 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films involved a sample used in a song on a motion picture sound-
track.53 Due to an agreement with the original owners of the musical 
composition, No Limit Films had a license to use it.54 As such, the 
copyright in the sound recording was at the center of the infringe-
ment action against the motion picture producer. Each of these cases 
touch on a different digital sampling scenario—no permission, per-
mission to use the sound recording but not the musical composition, 
and permission to use the musical composition but not the sound re-
cording—and therefore, produce a different rule of law.  
1.   Biz Markie 
 Grand Upright Music, the first major sampling case, was decided 
in 1991. Biz Markie had used three words and a portion of the music 
from the original recording of Alone Again (Naturally) by Gilbert 
O’Sullivan.55 In an action to obtain a preliminary injunction against 
the defendants preventing the unlicensed use of the composition and 
                                                                                                                      
 48. A replay eliminates the need to license the sound recording since the artists will 
be recreating their own sound recording, but it still requires a license of the musical com-
position since the song writer’s notes and arrangement are used. See PASSMAN, supra note 
21, at 296. 
 49. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 399 (6th Cir. 2004); 
Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 185. 
  50. 780 F. Supp. at 184-85. 
  51. 388 F.3d  1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004). 
  52. Id. 
  53. 383 F.3d at 393. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Grand Upright Music, 780 F. Supp. at 183. 
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sound recording, the federal court in the Southern District of New 
York saw only one issue: to determine the owner of the copyright in 
the song written by Gilbert O’Sullivan and the master sound re-
cording made by Gilbert O’Sullivan.56 
 While the plaintiff was not the artist, the court determined Grand 
Upright Music, Ltd. to be the owner of the copyrights to the musical 
composition and the original sound recording.  The determination of 
ownership was based on a deed transferring the copyrights to the 
plaintiff, testimony by the original artist that the plaintiff was the 
owner, and by evidence that the defendant had contacted the plain-
tiff in an attempt to obtain a license from the plaintiff before and af-
ter the album was released.57 
 The court went on to say that the actionable infringement was not 
that Biz Markie used the samples in his recordings, but that his re-
cord company distributed those materials without the proper permis-
sion to use the samples.58 The court also rejected the defendant’s ar-
gument that others in the rap music business participated in illegal 
sampling as “totally specious.”59 Not stopping there, the court stated: 
[I]t is clear that the defendants knew that they were violating the 
plaintiff’s rights as well as the rights of others. Their only aim was 
to sell thousands upon thousands of records. This callous disregard 
for the law and for the rights of others requires not only the pre-
liminary injunction sought by the plaintiff but also sterner meas-
ures.60 
After opening his opinion with “Thou shalt not steal,” District Judge 
Kevin Thomas Duffy ended his opinion by suggesting criminal penal-
ties for the defendant’s use of digital sampling in this case. 
 Grand Upright Music created a bright-line rule for digital sam-
pling: If there is no permission, digital sampling infringes and is per-
haps even criminal. The cases that would follow required a bit more 
evaluation on the part of the court to determine where to draw the 
line between permissible and infringing sampling. 
2.   Beastie Boys 
 In 2004, Newton v. Diamond was decided over a decade after 
Grand Upright Music. The Beastie Boys had sampled a six-second, 
three-note sequence from jazz flutist James W. Newton’s Choir in 
                                                                                                                      
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 183-84. 
 58. Id. at 185. 
 59. Id. at 141 n.2. 
 60. Id. 
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their song Pass the Mic.61 While the Beastie Boys had obtained a li-
cense to use the sound recording, they had not obtained a license to 
use the musical composition.62 The court identified the issue as 
“whether the incorporation of a short segment of a musical recording 
into a new musical recording, i.e., the practice of ‘sampling,’ requires 
a license to use both the performance and the composition of the 
original recording.”63 
 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court in 
holding that the Beastie Boys’ use of the musical composition was de 
minimis.64 The court essentially established the use of a de minimis 
test to determine copyright infringement in musical composition 
sampling cases. To establish an action for infringement, the use must 
be significant, substantial,65 and recognizable by an average audi-
ence.66 The court went on to say the case dealt with fragmented lit-
eral similarity.67  
 This de minimis analysis requires the sample to be a quantita-
tively and qualitatively significant portion of the entire original com-
position for establishment of infringement.68 Since the sampled 
three-note portion of the musical composition appeared only once, ac-
counting for six seconds of a four-and-a-half-minute song, it was not 
quantitatively significant.69 In addition, based on expert testimony, 
the sampled portion did not constitute the “hook” of the composition, 
which made it qualitatively insignificant as well.70 Newton offered no 
evidence beyond his own unique method of playing, which was not 
indicated on the score, to rebut the testimony of the Beastie Boys’ ex-
perts.71 While Newton had a copyright interest in the musical compo-
sition of Choir, the Beastie Boys’ use of “three notes separated by a 
half-step over a background C note” was not infringement.72 
 The rule established in Newton was nowhere near as bright as 
that in Grand Upright Music. Newton requires courts to examine the 
                                                                                                                      
 61. Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 
2905 (2005).  
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1192, 1196-97. 
 65. Id. at 1192-93. 
 66. Id. at 1193 (citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 434 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986) and the 
substantial similarity test). 
 67. Id. at 1195. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1195-96. 
 70. Id. at 1196. 
 71. Id. What prevented Newton’s unique performance technique from becoming a fac-
tor was that it was not fixed in a tangible medium. While Newton and his expert claimed 
that how he played the flute and the sound he produced made the composition copyright-
able, the sound recording was not at issue and the technique used was not written on the 
composition itself.  Id. at 1194.  
 72. Id. at 1196. 
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intricacies of samples and determine their significance and similarity 
to the protected musical compositions from which they come. This in-
depth de minimis analysis calls for expert testimony as well as “av-
erage audience” and substantial similarity determinations. In addi-
tion, Newton puts the onus on composers to include everything they 
contribute to a sound recording in the composition in order to protect 
more than just the sound created. With all that Grand Upright Music 
and Newton added to digital sampling law, they did not provide for 
the scenario of authorized use of a musical composition paired with 
unauthorized use of a sound recording.  
3.   No Limit 
 Mere months after Newton, the Sixth Circuit was faced with the 
remaining digital sampling scenario—where the sampling party has 
a valid license to the musical composition but not to the sound re-
cording of the sampled work—in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films. No Limit Films released a soundtrack to the movie I Got the 
Hook Up, which included a rap song 100 Miles and Runnin.73 The 
song included a sample from Get Off Your Ass and Jam by George 
Clinton, Jr. and the Funkadelics.74 Bridgeport Music owned the copy-
rights to both the sound recording and the musical composition of Get 
Off Your Ass and Jam and brought infringement actions for both.75 
Due to a sample use license agreement between Bridgeport Music 
and the original owners of the composition for 100 Miles and Runnin, 
the musical composition infringement action was barred.76 
 Facing only the issue of whether the admitted digital sampling of 
the Get Off Your Ass and Jam sound recording constituted infringe-
ment, the appellate court reversed the district court and threw out 
the substantial similarity and de minimis analyses.77 The court held 
that the analysis used to determine infringement of a musical com-
position is not the same as that used to determine infringement of a 
sound recording.78 
 Based on section 114(b) of the Copyright Act, the court held that 
sampling constitutes a derivative work and, as such, is an exclusive 
                                                                                                                      
 73. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 393 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 393-94. This agreement granted the sample use license in the Get Off Your 
Ass and Jam composition to the owners of the 100 Miles and Runnin composition, as well 
as to their licensees. Id. No Limit Films was granted an oral synchronization license to use 
100 Miles and Runnin on the I GOT THE HOOK UP soundtrack, making it a licensee of the 
owners of the composition and licensed to use the Get Off Your Ass and Jam composition. 
Id.  
 77. Id. at 395. 
 78. Id. at 396. 
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right of the copyright owner.79 The court gave three reasons as to 
why sampling should be considered derivative and exclusive: (1) the 
ease of enforcement, (2) the market’s capability of  controlling license 
fees, and (3) because sampling is never accidental.80 The court differ-
entiated this situation from that of sampling a musical composition 
by stating that the difference is mandated by statute and that even a 
small portion of a sound recording is of value.81 The sounds are the 
original work of the copyright owner in a sound recording, and when 
they are lifted in a sample, it is a “physical taking” from the owner’s 
chosen fixed medium.82 
 The Sixth Circuit recognized that it was creating a new rule in 
digital sampling law and offered further justifications. The court 
stated that its interpretation had scholarly support and was not “out 
of thin air.”83 The court noted that a significant number of artists and 
record companies have decided to obtain licenses when sampling the 
works of others.84 In addition, the recording industry has the knowl-
edge and means to establish sampling licensing guidelines and fees.85 
The court also recognized that its interpretation was based on a lit-
eral reading of the appropriate statute and that the recording indus-
try has sufficient ability to go to Congress and have the statute 
changed if they are not fond of the court’s application.86 Ultimately, 
Bridgeport Music created another bright-line rule in digital sam-
pling: If you sample a sound recording, you must pay for it or it is in-
fringement. 
IV.   LAW AND ECONOMICS: BRINGIN’ THE FUNK . . . OR THE                
EFFICIENCY? 
 Just as there are costs and benefits to particular actions taken by 
individuals, there are also costs and benefits to particular rules of 
law. It follows logically that, just as with individualized actions, laws 
should be established or enforced where the cost of enforcing a law is 
equal to the benefit of enforcing that law. The balancing of costs and 
benefits in order to achieve efficient outcomes is the foundation of  
 
                                                                                                                      
 79. Id. at 398. 
 80. Id. at 398-99. In regard to the ease of enforcement, the court stated that it is as 
simple as “[g]et a license or do not sample,” especially since artists are permitted to make 
replays and duplicate sounds from other recordings. As to market price control, the court 
stated that a copyright holder could not demand a price that was higher than the cost to 
duplicate the desired sound. As for sampling never being accidental, the court stated that 
sampling a sound recording is knowingly taking someone else’s work. Id.  
 81. Id. at 399. A sample can save, cost, or add something new to a song. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 400. 
 84. Id. at 401. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 401-02. 
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economic analysis. Law and economics is the discipline that brings 
economic analysis to the legal arena. It is a tool for analyzing the 
costs and benefits of instituting particular rules, establishing par-
ticular rights, and enforcing particular punishments for the purpose 
of determining an efficient legal outcome.  
 The basic assumption of economic analysis is that people act ra-
tionally. In extrapolating that to the law, the assumption is that 
courts and lawmakers act rationally and that the music industry will 
react rationally to the decisions of the courts and the lawmakers. The 
problem is that when courts decide cases, it is typically the rational-
ity of one person or as many as nine individuals that determines the 
rule for everyone else. In addition, when Congress acts by passing 
statutory law, it is a representative group creating laws for everyone 
else. As such, the statutory and case law are subject to a law-and-
economics analysis for the purpose of measuring their practical—
applying to those actually affected by the law—efficiency.87    
A.   Intellectual Property & Copyright Law, Generally 
 As we have seen, digital sampling is all about copyright law and 
the exclusive rights and protections under that law. More broadly, 
digital sampling falls under the intellectual property umbrella. In 
order to understand what economic thinking has to offer digital sam-
pling, one must understand what the discipline says about intellec-
tual property and copyright law in general. 
1.   Intellectual Property 
 Intellectual property almost defines itself. It is the area of law 
that identifies the ownership rights of ideas or the expression of 
those ideas. There are different areas of intellectual property, includ-
ing patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and copyrights. While, for the 
purposes of this Comment, we are concerned only with copyrights, 
observations can be made from an economic analysis of intellectual 
property in general.  
 Property is divided into real and personal property.  Intellectual 
property falls into the category of personal property as it is the idea 
or expression of a particular person or persons. The peculiarity in de-
fining intellectual property as real or personal is that, unlike either 
                                                                                                                      
 87. “Legal rules are to be judged by the structure of incentives they establish and the 
consequences of people altering their behavior in response to those incentives.” DAVID D. 
FRIEDMAN, LAW’S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 11 
(2000). 
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of the two, intellectual property is not scarce.88 An item is not scarce 
if one person’s use of that item does not prevent others from using or 
obtaining the item or an exact copy of it. For example, listeners can-
not use up a song in such a way that it disappears like a tree or a 
piece of clothing. Despite this oddity, intellectual property is personal 
property of the author or rightful owner, and it deserves protection. 
 The question for law and economics then becomes: Is it efficient to 
protect intellectual property as private personal property, or should 
it be open for all to use freely upon creation? Intellectual property is 
just that—intellectual. It is the product of one’s mind, a unique idea 
or expression of an individual. If such property is made available to 
any and all upon creation, there is no incentive for creators to create. 
For example, if songwriters cannot profit from their ability to pen 
that platinum ballad, they are less likely to even put the pen to pa-
per. Even the pride of being known as a creator or inventor is weak-
ened as an incentive; it no longer matters who did the legwork be-
cause anyone can have or use the product created. On the other side 
of that argument is the idea that granting exclusive property rights 
in intellectual property creates monopoly-like circumstances. This is 
inefficient from the perspective that society benefits from new ideas 
and expressions. For example, if songwriters are not forced to license 
their compositions to artists, it is possible that no one will ever hear 
those words and notes performed. Under another and perhaps more 
important example, if pharmaceutical companies have uninhibited 
exclusive rights to their drugs, they can prevent the production of 
lower-cost generic drugs and even the development of new related 
drugs.89  
 While private ownership can serve as a means to avoid the com-
mons problem (free riders),90 private ownership can result in an anti-
commons problem (holdouts),91 as indicated by the simple examples 
above. Given appropriate intellectual property laws, however, the 
                                                                                                                      
 88. See Daniel R. Cahoy, Changing the Rules in the Middle of the Game: How the Pro-
spective Application of Judicial Decisions Related to Intellectual Property Can Promote 
Economic Efficiency, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 8 (2003). 
 89. Pharmaceuticals are afforded patent protection, which lasts only twenty years. 35 
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). The length of many pharmaceutical patents is often limited by such 
things as required FDA testing. Posting of Gary Becker to The Becker-Posner Blog, http:// 
www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2004/12/pharmaceutical.html (Dec. 12, 2004, 20:42 
EST). 
 90. When property is held in common, the risk arises that an individual user will take 
full use of the property without regard for another’s use and without paying for the use. 
Relying on the fact that others will continue to pay to maintain the property and pick up 
slack, the renegade user gets a free ride. 
 91. When property is held privately, an individual owner can prevent the transfer of 
the use of that property to society for higher and better use. If several private property 
owners have something from which society can benefit, one individual can hold out for a 
higher price, relying on the knowledge that his or her property is essential and that society 
will be forced to pay what he or she demands. 
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market will be able to determine the price society is willing to pay for 
new ideas and expressions. Given this, the courts and Congress have 
created specific rules surrounding the rights granted to those who 
create and invent specific kinds of intellectual property. There are 
different rules—and different resulting rights—for patents, trade-
marks, trade secrets, and copyrights. This Comment focuses solely on 
the exclusive rights established by copyright law. 
2.   Copyrights 
 The basic tenets of copyright law necessary for the discussions in 
this Comment were discussed in Part III.A. In review, the Copyright 
Act grants certain exclusive rights to copyright owners—including 
the rights to make copies, prepare derivative works, control sale and 
distribution of the work, control sale and distribution of any copies or 
derivative works, and control the public performance or display of 
the work.92 Even though this seems to be all anyone might want to do 
with a copyright, thus establishing a creative monopoly, copyright 
law only protects the expressions of ideas and not the ideas them-
selves. These exclusive rights also create only limited monopolies as 
they have durational limits.93 In addition, each of these rights can be 
transferred and licensed separately or all together.94 In dealing with 
most copyrights, including those involved in digital sampling, copy-
right owners must register their copyrights in order to bring in-
fringement suits.95 The Copyright Act places other limits and restric-
tions on the exclusive rights of copyright owners that are beyond the 
scope of this Comment.96 
 The nature of the copyright appears to have some blackletter effi-
ciency. As the statutes are written, the owners are given the sole op-
portunity for exploitation of their creations; however, it does not last 
forever, is surmountable, and is open to market influences. While the 
unintended consequence of granting exclusive property rights tends 
to be holdouts, the various limitations on exclusive rights give effi-
ciency a chance. For example, if I were to write a blockbuster caliber 
manuscript about the potential dangers of taking that high-paying, 
large-corporate, law firm associate position right out of law school—
and assuming no legal issues with John Grisham—I would have an 
exclusive copyright in that literary work. I would also have an exclu-
sive right in any derivative works made from that script, including a 
motion picture adaptation. While copyright law gives me the ability 
                                                                                                                      
 92. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000). 
 93. See id. §§ 301-305. 
 94. See id. §§ 201-205. 
 95. See id. § 411. 
 96. See id. §§ 107-122. 
2005]           LAW AND ECONOMICS ON DIGITAL SAMPLING 313 
 
to monopolize the exploitation of my masterpiece, it cannot become a 
blockbuster unless I sell it—transfer the copyright—to a movie stu-
dio to make the film. It becomes economically more efficient—
basically, more lucrative—for me to relax my white-knuckled grip on 
the copyright so I can see my work come to life on the big screen and 
get my date with Oscar. Granted, I may not have the bargaining 
power of a major motion picture studio to demand some outrageous 
price, but the sum would most likely be worth more money than what 
a copy of my manuscript is worth. However, if my product is of block-
buster caliber, I can shop it around to several studios and let the 
market for blockbuster scripts drive up my price. Regardless, the lim-
ited nature and flexibility of the rights granted by copyright law 
promote efficient use and distribution of the creative expression of 
ideas. How efficient those laws are depends upon a court’s applica-
tion of those laws, subject to its own cost-benefit analysis.97 
B.   Copyrights in the Music Biz 
 Copyrights in the music industry offer exploitation opportunities 
similar to that described in Part IV.A.2, supra. If songwriters create 
platinum ballads, it makes no sense economically for them to mo-
nopolize their uses. Instead, songwriters want an artist to use the 
ballad because that is how they get paid. As such, songwriters can 
put their work into the musical composition market and, rather than 
demanding the highest bidder, be forced to compete with other song-
writers to have the best—or most popular and most appropriate—
artist perform their songs. Allowing those composition copyrights to 
be used by others is very lucrative. There is also money, albeit not as 
much as that afforded to a songwriter, to be made in performing that 
platinum ballad. Artists need songwriters, and songwriters need art-
ists. It is the limited-monopoly-creating copyright law that allows 
each to exploit the same work efficiently. 
 In the music industry, copyrights in songs come in two parts: the 
sound recording and the musical composition.98 Most folks have fig-
ured out that keeping these copyrights to themselves is not the most 
financially sound decision. Artists transfer the rights in their sound 
recordings to their record company so that CDs can be pressed, pack-
aged, promoted, and distributed in a magnitude that the artist indi-
vidually could never match. Composers or songwriters do not typi-
cally transfer the rights to their songs, but instead they license the 
use of their compositions to artists and record companies, through 
                                                                                                                      
 97. For a discussion of digital sampling case law, see infra Part IV.C. 
 98. For a discussion of the differences between a sound recording and a musical com-
position, see supra Part III.A. 
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publishers, to create sound recordings.99 Obviously, things get a bit 
more complex—or more simplistic, depending on your perspective—
when the artists performing the songs are also the ones writing the 
songs or if only one or two members of a band write the songs, while 
all members perform those songs. Those details are not essential to 
the purpose of this Comment. Regardless, in dealing with sound re-
cordings and musical composition copyrights, it is all about the eco-
nomics—or the Benjamins.100 
 Money from sound recording and musical composition copyrights 
is made in royalties. Royalties are the monies paid to an artist or a 
songwriter for the sale or use of their copyrighted work.101 Royalties 
are the means through which the music business seeks to make 
copyright law economically efficient for the parties involved in record 
deals; they are the transfer price of exclusive rights. Even though the 
market determines the transfer price for sound recordings and musi-
cal compositions, the music industry is not the best example of a per-
fectly efficient market. There are basically four major labels—with 
almost all small labels being owned by the majors—with immense 
amounts of bargaining power.102 Artists and songwriters rarely have 
equal bargaining power.103 Even when they achieve platinum caliber, 
that power is limited.104 Until artists and songwriters achieve “super-
star” status,105 they face a take-it-or-leave-it attitude from record 
companies. These conditions do not result in the highest valued work 
obtaining the highest possible price. The benefit a record company 
may receive from a sound recording can far outweigh the cost it 
spends to get it, while the benefit to the artist or songwriter may not 
cover the cost of living. 
 In such a one-sided market, artists are susceptible to ex post facto 
opportunism. For example, a record company can sign a band to a 
multi-album deal that should span seven to eight years and simply 
drop the band after one or two albums because the band has not re-
couped.106 However, this environment eliminates the fear of monopoly 
                                                                                                                      
 99. See PASSMAN, supra note 21, at 69, 239. 
 100. “Benjamins” is a hip-hop slang term for money. It is a reference to the fact that 
Benjamin Franklin is pictured on the one-hundred dollar bill. 
 101. PASSMAN, supra note 21, at 69. 
 102. See id. at 64;  U.S. Agency Clears Sony-BMG Music Merger, supra note 18. 
 103. See PASSMAN, supra note 21, at 86-88; Risa C. Letowsky, Note, Broke or Exploited: 
The Real Reason Behind Artist Bankruptcies, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 625, 626 
(2002). 
 104. PASSMAN, supra note 21, at 88. 
 105. Id. at 87 (defining a superstar as an artist with “[s]ales from 2,500,000 into the 
stratosphere”). 
 106. Id. at 100. Recoupment refers to “[t]he process of keeping money to recover an ad-
vance . . . .” Id. at 80. An advance is money paid to an artist before an album is recorded or 
sold. Id. To get this money back, or to recoup an advance, record companies keep artist 
royalties until the advanced sum is refunded. Id. 
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creation by copyright owners. The structure of the music business 
simply will not allow rampant holdouts. An artist’s unique creation 
or expression is treated more like a commodity. As it is obvious from 
the number of bands playing small venues in any town, the number 
of artists that actually obtain “superstar” status is extremely small 
compared to the number of artists who are shopping demos. Eco-
nomic analysis prefers the private property system to avoid the 
commons problem, leaving the door open to the anticommons prob-
lem. The music business has created a market where artists can have 
privately owned copyrights, but if they hold out, the market leaves 
them behind. This seems to be very efficient; there are more than 
enough artists to produce desirable goods, but the record companies, 
while limiting the monopoly power of those artists, control that flow 
to market based on music demand. 
 Also present in this environment is the compulsory license. As 
mentioned in Part III.B, supra, compulsory licenses only exist for 
musical compositions, and they force owners of copyrights in musical 
compositions to license their works for use by others if certain crite-
ria are met. This practice is also an efficient control on the monopoly 
power of songwriters; they are not the gatekeepers of their creative 
work. Additionally, it is an efficient incentive to promote the creativ-
ity of songwriters; their work cannot be exploited without first pay-
ing a licensing fee, via royalties. Even though the monopoly power is 
limited, the fee would seem to create another holdout, anticommons 
problem; however, the compulsory license statute actually sets a cap 
on the fee.107 This should solve the anticommons problem in musical 
composition licensing. Not surprisingly though, record companies flex 
their muscles and strike deals with songwriters to avoid paying the 
statutory maximum price for compulsory licenses or even for all 
songs licensed on an album.108 As such, efficiency concerns again 
arise with the extreme bargaining power of the record companies. 
This too—like the power of record companies over artists—seems to 
be very efficient because, given a statutory cap, there would be no 
bargaining in the musical composition market if the record compa-
nies did not strike these deals. Songwriters would and should de-
mand the cap since it is the record company that is coming to them to 
get permission to use the composition. The influence of the record 
companies prevents songwriters from settling on a take-it-or-leave-it 
approach. 
 After determining who the copyright owners are and who gets 
paid what in musical composition and sound recording royalties, 
other issues, like digital sampling, arise. After a song is recorded, it 
                                                                                                                      
 107. See 37 C.F.R. § 255 (2004). 
 108. PASSMAN, supra note 21, at 210-18. 
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is possible that another artist, typically in the hip-hop or rap genres, 
will want to use a small portion of the song in a new work he or she 
is creating. The industry has evolved to establish sampling licenses 
in these circumstances. Sampling artists pay the owner of the sam-
pled work for the use, either by some royalty schedule or by a flat fee.  
As will be seen in Part IV.C, potential disputes arise as to when a li-
cense must be acquired and what a license allows.  
 While digital sampling is not the procurement and exploitation of 
an entire work, it does raise copyright issues. If copyright owners 
alone are permitted to sample, the monopoly concern again surfaces; 
however, allowing a sampling artist to have free reign on any and all 
previously recorded musical works implicates weakened copyright 
protections. Ultimately, law-and-economics analysis focuses on the 
trade-offs that define the digital sampling issue. If copyrights create 
pure private property ownership rights in sound recordings and mu-
sical compositions, original works are fully protected but the creative 
works of another may be inhibited.  For example, without the use of 
digital sampling, Ice Ice Baby and U Can’t Touch This may not have 
been so easily and indelibly imprinted in the minds of millions. Other 
artists would not have sought to use digital sampling to create new 
works that they would hope would be as unforgettable. On the other 
hand, perhaps allowing unrestrained digital sampling inhibits origi-
nal artists. Under Pressure and Super Freak were very popular 
songs, written and performed by legendary entertainers. Others of 
the same talent and renown may be less likely to create original 
works for fear that the songs, or a portion of them, could be used in 
some rap or hip-hop song in the future. Either way, copyright law 
seems to have a stifling effect on artists in the area of digital sam-
pling. 
C.   The Case Law 
 The three cases discussed in Part III.D, supra, lay out three sepa-
rate rules of law as applied to three different scenarios involving 
digital sampling. As such, there are three different economic analy-
ses required in order to establish law-and-economics solutions for 
digital sampling issues. 
1.   The Line Is Bright in Grand Upright 
 In Grand Upright Music, the court held that when the sampling 
artist does not have permission to use the copyrighted work of an-
other, it qualifies as infringement, and the artist should be subject to 
criminal penalties.109 Biz Markie did not have permission to use ei-
                                                                                                                      
 109. Grand Upright Music Ltd. V. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182. 
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ther the sound recording or the musical composition in question; 
however, Biz Markie and the other defendants did attempt to acquire 
a requisite license from the plaintiffs.110 Regardless, the infringing 
use, or release of the song containing the sample, occurred before 
permission was granted and even after consent was denied.111 It was 
the outright disregard for the plaintiff’s exclusive rights that moti-
vated the court’s decision.112 The court’s decision established a bright-
line rule for digital sampling cases—digital sampling without per-
mission is infringement with potential criminal prosecution.113 
 The establishment of a bright-line rule in digital sampling copy-
right law allows for greater judicial efficiency. When a particular 
element is present, there is a particular result. Based on Grand Up-
right Music, when consent to use a sample of a copyrighted song is 
not obtained, the defendant is liable for copyright infringement. 
Judges do not have to apply a balancing test or a substantial similar-
ity analysis like the court did in Newton v. Diamond. It creates a 
hard-and-fast rule that allows judges to ignore creative considera-
tions, resulting in speedier and more predictable litigation.  
 This seemingly efficient rule is not without unintended conse-
quences. Copyright law is meant to foster creativity by protecting 
creative works. While the bright-line rule in Grand Upright Music 
protects the creative works of one artist, that same protection stifles 
the creativity of another artist. While enforcing copyright exclusivity, 
this rule applied by default actually extends the protection available 
under copyright law. Refusing to consider the creative aspects of an 
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work ignores the fact that the 
Copyright Act placed limitations upon the owners’ exclusive rights.114 
 Limitations were placed on copyrights in sound recordings and 
musical compositions.115 The limitations placed on sound recordings 
deal mostly with public performance rights; however, a major limita-
tion placed on musical compositions is the compulsory license. The 
compulsory license existed when Grand Upright Music was decided; 
so if the rule established by that court is applied to digital sampling, 
it ignores this statutorily created right of an artist to use a musical 
composition. This inconsistency transforms what seems to be judicial 
efficiency from one perspective into judicial supremacy.116 
                                                                                                                      
 110. Id. at 184-85. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 185. 
 114. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2000). 
 115. Section 114 of the Copyright Act establishes the scope of exclusive rights in sound 
recordings, and section 115 does the same for musical compositions.  17 U.S.C. §§ 114-115 
(2000). 
 116. It is generally accepted that the legislature creates laws, representing the views 
and opinions of constituents and lobbying members of various industries. It is also gener-
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 Grand Upright Music also serves to establish a kind of ex ante 
punishment. The bright-line rule sends the message to potential 
samplers that if they use portions of another artist’s sound recording 
or musical composition without the requisite licenses, they are liable 
for infringement and could face criminal prosecution, regardless of 
the extent or nature of the use. In an attempt to prevent copyright 
infringement, the court has said digital sampling without permission 
is never permitted. Unauthorized sampling artists know before they 
act that they will be punished.  
 While this level of deterrence seems to uphold the principles of 
protection in the Copyright Act, it opens the door to an unintended 
consequence of ex post facto opportunism. For example, assume an 
artist wants to sample a song, and he or she obtains permission from 
the owner of the sampled work because he or she is aware of the po-
tential punishment for failure to obtain permission. After agreeing to 
pay for the use and after the new work is created and released, the 
sampling artist then refuses to pay the licensing fee. This requires 
the copyright owner to seek an injunction and to file a breach of con-
tract action; it requires the owner to bear some of that licensing cost 
through the expenditure of legal fees. As a result, the chance for set-
tlement also arises, which could potentially benefit the sampling art-
ist. While this ex post opportunism could be prevented by drafting 
the contract in such a way to avoid these issues, promises can still be 
broken and courts may be called on to intervene.  Regardless, injured 
parties must still make the first move. The supposedly deterred sam-
pling artist can potentially shift the burden of enforcing this ex ante 
deterrence on the artists it is supposed to protect. Admittedly, this is 
a risky move on the part of the sampling artist, but it is the internal 
cost-benefit analysis, weighing the probability of certain risks, that 
determines if the action is taken. The impact of the law set forth in 
Grand Upright Music only serves as a variable in that equation. Re-
gardless, the opportunity exists for the sampling artist to slow the 
payment process while still benefiting from the use. 
                                                                                                                      
ally accepted that it is the role of the courts to interpret and apply those laws to particular 
cases and disputed issues. Here, allowing the rule of law from Grand Upright Music to 
trump the compulsory license limitation on musical composition rights permits case law to 
overshadow well-established legislative action. The existence of the compulsory license in-
dicates a desire on the part of society to permit some activities that would otherwise be 
barred by Grand Upright Music. It is arguable that the compulsory license itself indicates 
a desire to prohibit all unauthorized uses, just as was done in Grand Upright Music; how-
ever, Grand Upright Music gave artists unfettered control—no permission, no use.  The 
compulsory license actually forces artists to allow the use of their work.  In order to make 
that compulsion more palatable, artists were granted the compulsory license fee.  Grand 
Upright Music granted no such economic benefit to artists.  Actually paying artists to pre-
vent monopoly of their work further indicates society’s desire to prevent total control over 
creative works.   
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 The rule from Grand Upright Music is also subject to anticom-
mons issues. Requiring sampling artists to get permission before us-
ing copyrighted works puts them at the financial mercy of the artists 
they sample. It creates an exclusive private property right that al-
lows the copyright owner to demand the highest price. This is only 
problematic for sound recordings unless the rule is applied without 
recognizing the compulsory license provision for musical composi-
tions. Arguably, the sampling artist will only pay a price equal to or 
less than the cost of reproducing the desired sample on his or her 
own. While the opportunity to replay the sample should cure the an-
ticommons problem, forcing such a result is an inefficient application 
of copyright protections. Artists are forced into license bargaining 
with every occurrence of digital sampling, regardless of the extent or 
nature of the use. Resources are expended in the bargaining process 
with only the mere possibility of a mutually beneficial outcome, since 
the copyright owner holds greater bargaining power and a potential 
for the take-it-or-leave-it attitude. 
 The Grand Upright Music decision also warrants a discussion of 
the effectiveness of criminal punishments. After finding Biz Markie’s 
sampling to be infringement, the court suggested that the matter 
was ripe for criminal prosecution.117 While Judge Duffy likened Biz 
Markie’s behavior to criminal theft, the rapper’s actions constituted a 
classic example of using another’s copyrighted work without permis-
sion. Regardless, the criminal statute cited by the court for the U.S. 
Attorney’s reference allows for fines and even imprisonment for will-
ful copyright infringement.118 As the Sixth Circuit would later articu-
late, all sampling is willful.119 It follows that if sampling is an in-
fringement, then the infringement would also be willful. As such, the 
key factor is whether there was infringement. Despite that, neither 
of the other courts that dealt with groundbreaking digital sampling 
issues suggested such criminal measures. Even the court in Bridge-
port Music, which actually did find the defendant liable for copyright 
infringement, failed to mention criminal penalties. 
 Even though criminal prosecutions were not apparently pursued 
in the digital sampling cases after Grand Upright Music, it is the ef-
ficiency of such a determination with which law-and-economics 
analysis is concerned. While it might seem more of a deterrent to 
subject sampling artists to criminal punishment, beyond civil in-
fringement liability, the fact still remains that rappers continued to 
sample after Grand Upright Music without facing criminal prosecu-
                                                                                                                      
 117. Grand Upright Music, Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records Inc., 780 F. Supp. 182, 185 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 118. 17 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 2319 (2000). 
 119. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d  390, 399 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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tion. If lawyers truly act rationally, the fact that criminal penalties 
are not sought by copyright plaintiffs would lead to the conclusion 
that it is not the most efficient course to take for an adequate rem-
edy. If courts truly do act rationally, they would mention criminal 
penalties, just as Judge Duffy did, if such penalties would be a suffi-
cient method of deterrence and redress of injury.  
 The key difference between Grand Upright Music and Newton or 
Bridgeport is that Biz Markie did not have permission to use any 
part of Gilbert O’Sullivan’s song, whereas both defendants in the 
other cases had licenses for either the sound recording or the musical 
composition. This difference might lend itself more easily to a deter-
mination of willfulness—required in criminal copyright infringe-
ment—in the supposed infringement by the defendant. The issue still 
remains as to whether it truly is efficient to bring criminal charges in 
digital sampling cases. 
 From an efficiency standpoint, criminal law has the advantage of 
allowing those with inadequate resources or tenuous claims to let 
prosecution by the state proceed with their cases.120 Criminal law 
does not require the individual victim to decide when and how to 
bring claims against the defendant.121 Generally, criminal law can 
also reduce the fear that results in potential victims after a particu-
lar crime has been committed, as the punishments often involve im-
prisonment.122 These considerations fall short in the context of digital 
sampling litigation. Typically, it is not the starving artist that brings 
the claim of copyright infringement for digital sampling against the 
monolithic, money-grubbing record company. In all three digital 
sampling cases discussed in this Comment, it was a record company 
that brought the suit against another record company (or film stu-
dio), both of which were actually grubbing for money. 
 As discussed in Part IV.B., supra, artists typically transfer their 
copyrights to the record companies that sign them.123 As the copy-
right owners, the record companies must protect against infringe-
ment. Given the state of the music industry—dominated by four ma-
jor record companies who often own the smaller labels—the actual 
copyright owner is rarely without the resources or clout to bring a 
claim against sampling artists and their record company. While the 
individual victim in digital sampling copyright cases can be seen as 
                                                                                                                      
 120. FRIEDMAN, supra note 87, at 282. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. To avoid unnecessary confusion, the subject of publishing was not discussed in 
Part III. However, it should be noted that songwriters also typically transfer or license 
their musical composition copyrights to publishers who then license the use of the composi-
tions. PASSMAN, supra note 21, at 203-04.  Often these publishers are just as powerful as 
the record companies, if they are not owned by the record companies themselves. 
2005]           LAW AND ECONOMICS ON DIGITAL SAMPLING 321 
 
the original artist or creator of the work, it is most often the record 
company. Such an entity is capable of deciding when and how to 
bring digital sampling copyright infringement claims. The potential 
reduction in fear of crime that might result from criminal prosecu-
tion is also limited by the reality of the music industry. Potential vic-
tims are technically the record companies that own every copyright 
to every song. The companies would have no idea which copyrights 
are vulnerable to falling prey to a sampling artist.124  
 Perhaps the most convincing argument against the alleged effi-
ciency of criminal law, in the digital sampling context, is that both 
sides are driven by money. Sampling artists sample to make a new 
work that they hope will sell millions of copies; sampled artists want 
to be sure that if someone profits off of their original work that they 
benefit from some of that gain. The motivation for digital sampling 
litigation is royalties, not punishment. Potential criminal prosecution 
with fines or imprisonment or both might prevent a sampling artist 
from future sampling of other works, but criminal penalties offer no 
reimbursement to the victim. Prison time does nothing for the copy-
right owner but keep a potential sample licensee behind bars and out 
of negotiations; fines do not even go the copyright owners.  There is 
no incentive for sampled artists or their record companies to prevent 
sampling and sales through means that would prevent them from 
making money off those sales and the use of a sample. While crimi-
nal law might scare sampling artists ex ante from sampling without 
permission, it does not offer the most desirable penalties ex post for 
the unauthorized use of copyrighted works. 
 As the first case to tackle the issue, Grand Upright Music offers a 
great deal to consider in formulating an efficient solution to handling 
digital sampling copyright claims. Still, the case offers a very limited 
scope and analysis.125 The court seemed to be on a mission to punish 
the defendant rather than to set out the best possible model for fu-
ture courts to follow. Grand Upright Music offers the efficiency of a 
bright-line rule but opens the door for other, less-than-efficient out-
comes. 
2.   A Diamond in the Rough 
 In Newton v. Diamond, the court established the use of a de 
minimis analysis in determining whether the unauthorized digital 
                                                                                                                      
 124. It is inconceivable that Bruce Hornsby or his record company had any clue that a 
decade after writing and recording, The Way It Is, a rapper named 2Pac would sample it.  
When a song is created, there is no way for the artist or his record company to know 
whether or not it will ever be sampled. 
 125. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 804 n.16 (6th Cir. 
2005) (criticizing Grand Upright Music as providing no indication as to how the decision 
was reached).  
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sampling of a musical composition constituted copyright infringe-
ment. The Beastie Boys had obtained a license to use the sound re-
cording, but not the musical composition.126 Despite the unauthorized 
nature of the sample, the court held that the use of the musical com-
position by the Beastie Boys was not substantial enough to support a 
claim for copyright infringement.127 The sampled portion was found 
to be neither a quantitatively or qualitatively significant portion of 
the entire original work.128 There are costs and benefits to a less ob-
jective rule.  As such, there are various unintended consequences to 
analyze along with their counterpoints. 
 The application of a de minimis standard to digital sampling cases 
reduces the judicial efficiency offered by the bright-line rule of Grand 
Upright Music. De minimis determinations hinge on a subjective 
“average audience” inquiry,129 which requires various levels of analy-
sis to determine things like substantial similarity and fragmented 
literal similarity. Fragmented literal similarity requires considera-
tion of the quantitative and qualitative significance of copied portions 
to the original works.130 Clearly, this kind of in-depth analysis slows 
down the litigation process. Each side offers its own evidence and ex-
perts as to the qualitative nature of the sampled portion and inter-
pretations of what exactly an average audience may recognize. The 
entire process relies on subjective judgments rather than a default 
rule that says simply if there is no license, there is infringement.  
 Since more resources are required to reach the same desired 
end—resolution of digital sampling litigation—it would seem that 
Newton is a far less efficient rule than Grand Upright Music. Judi-
cial efficiency definitely suffers at the hands of the Newton rule, but 
there is also a potential reduction in judicial expenditure due to such 
a rule. Since each case of claimed infringement would require its own 
individual analysis of the sample and original work to determine 
substantiality of copying or use, plaintiffs would be less certain of the 
outcome of such claims. With the Grand Upright Music rule, plain-
tiffs know that if no license was granted, they win; however, with 
Newton, they do not have that same assurance. This results in a re-
luctance to expend the necessary resources to bring and sufficiently 
present a case for copyright infringement based on the sample of an-
other artist. Not only does judicial efficiency get a boost, but settle-
ment becomes a much more viable alternative to litigation. Settle-
ment allows for rational, efficient bargaining to reach an outcome. If 
a plaintiff is assured a victory in court, there may be no reason to 
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consider settlement offers in an attempt to maximize the outcome 
with a jury verdict; however, when the chances of winning in court 
are unpredictable and the costs of going to court increase, plaintiffs 
become more amenable to out-of-court resolutions. 
 The Newton rule also raises efficiency concerns in the area of gen-
eral copyright philosophy. Assuming that the rationale behind copy-
right law is meant to foster creativity through the protection of crea-
tive works, allowing even some unauthorized uses of copyrighted 
works to fall outside the parameters of the exclusive rights afforded a 
copyright owner weakens the effectiveness of copyright law. Artists 
become less inclined to produce copyrightable works for fear of hav-
ing them used, without permission, for a pecuniary gain in which 
they will never share. The Newton court basically reduced copyright 
protection for musical compositions by making it more difficult to 
guard the unique manner of creating the sounds produced in the 
sound recording. Better explained, the plaintiff in Newton offered 
evidence that his method of playing the three notes in the sample 
was so unique that they should be deemed significant to the entire 
composition; however, the court found his method to be an element of 
the sound recording since the composer did not actually fix that 
unique method in the medium of the musical composition. Essen-
tially, in order to have some unique method of playing an instrument 
protected in the musical composition, beyond the actual sound pro-
duced in the sound recording, the songwriter must write it down on 
the sheet music. This heightened requirement not only stifles crea-
tivity, but it is inefficient because more time must be spent by the 
songwriter ensuring copyright protection than actually creating copy-
rightable material. Such a result is in complete opposition to the 
purposes of copyright law.  
 On the other side of the above argument, it is rather inefficient to 
always require an artist to go through the process of obtaining a li-
cense for uses of copyrighted works that may be de minimis. Average 
audience, substantial similarity, fragmented literal similarity, quan-
titative significance, and qualitative significance all exist because 
they were determined, at some point, to be efficient, rational methods 
of resolving likeness disputes. The cost of ignoring established legal 
analytical tools, measured against the benefit of allowing songwriters 
to create without concern for securing protection, is too high. The im-
plicit requirement established by Newton does not diminish any pro-
tections available to songwriters; it simply requires greater specific-
ity ex ante if some facet of a musical composition, like uniqueness of 
technique, is going to be a basis for an infringement claim. It is inef-
ficient to extend copyright protections beyond the scope of the law 
simply to promote the use of weak, often inapplicable, evidence in in-
fringement actions. 
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 The Copyright Act establishes protection for owners of copyrights 
in sound recordings and musical compositions. Grand Upright Music 
makes no distinctions between infringement in either types of copy-
right. This, again, brings the efficiency of the bright-line rule into 
question. The Copyright Act set out not only different types of copy-
rights for musical works but also grants them different protections 
and places different limitations on those protections. The Newton 
rule recognizes the distinctive nature of each. Granted, the Beastie 
Boys had a license to use the sound recording and not the musical 
composition, requiring an obvious focus on musical compositions. The 
rule in Grand Upright Music still does not require or even mention 
that distinction.131 If nothing else, the Newton court produced an effi-
cient result in setting out criteria for a situation never addressed by 
the Grand Upright Music court, yet one that is very plausible given 
the nature of the copyright law for musical works. Clearly a differ-
ence exists between sound recordings and musical compositions. Ra-
tional decisionmaking would call for dealing with each copyright 
separately. In addition, any brief look at copyright infringement 
cases involving other media reveals the leaning of the courts toward 
more in-depth, multifactor analyses rather than bright-line rules.132 
Again, if courts truly act rationally, then evidence that they prefer 
case-by-case analyses over bright-line rules in copyright infringe-
ment claims would point to Newton as promoting an efficient rule. 
3.   There Is No Limit to the Madness 
 In Bridgeport Music, the court established a bright-line rule in re-
gard to sound recordings. No Limit Films had a license to use the 
musical composition, but not the sound recording.133 The court held 
that since copyright owners have exclusive rights to derivative works 
and a sample is a derivative work, sampling is an exclusive right of 
the sound recording copyright owner.134 The court also held that the 
analysis in determining infringement of musical compositions was 
different from that for determining infringement of sound re-
                                                                                                                      
 131. It is possible for the holding in Grand Upright Music to be read to assert that in-
fringement is automatic if there is neither a license for the sound recording or the musical 
composition, or that infringement is automatic if either license is not acquired. 
 132. See Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Harper & Row, Pub-
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 133. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 393-94 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 134. See id. at 398. 
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cordings.135 Bridgeport offers the best of both worlds from Grand Up-
right Music and Newton—a bright-line rule paired with recognition 
of the need for separate analyses. This compromise, or potential reso-
lution, is not without its own unintended consequences and ineffi-
ciencies. 
 Bridgeport Music offers the efficiency of a bright-line rule to copy-
right infringement cases involving sound recordings. This Comment 
has already highlighted the efficiency virtues of bright-line rules and 
even the unintended circumstances resulting from their use.136 What 
is important about the Bridgeport Music bright-line rule is that it es-
tablished a bright line but recognized the need for an analysis of mu-
sical compositions like that found in Newton. Bridgeport Music basi-
cally states that, in copyright infringement cases like Grand Upright 
Music—no licenses at all—the sample is scrutinized for infringement 
of the musical composition based on Newton while infringement of 
the sound infringement of the sound recording is automatically 
found. In cases like Newton, the Newton rule still applies. In cases 
where only the sound recording is used without permission, a finding 
of infringement is guaranteed.137 This approach allows each of the 
different factual circumstances to be treated as unique, which is in 
line with the copyright law’s creation of separate copyrights. While it 
may seem more efficient to have a single rule that applies in all mu-
sic copyright circumstances, the more rational approach is to recog-
nize obvious differences in the copyrights.  
 The Bridgeport Music court asserted that sampling was actually a 
“physical taking” of the sound recording.138 That, along with the 
copyright law and the difficulty of applying an in-depth analysis, is 
offered as justification for treating unauthorized sampling of the 
sound recording more strictly than the musical composition.139 Dif-
ferentiating between a physical taking and an intellectual taking is 
not mentioned in the copyright law. In digital sampling, the use of a 
musical composition cannot be separated from the use of a sound re-
cording. A sampling artist cannot use one without using the other. 
While a new performer could use the words from a composition with-
out reproducing the actual sound recorded by the original performer, 
by definition a digital sampler lifts a portion of a song from the sound 
recording to be used in a new work. Thus, by using a portion of the 
sound recording, a digital sampler automatically uses the materials 
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from the musical composition. If the works are not independent of 
each other in the use of a digital sample, then the analysis of those 
samples for the purposes of determining infringement, through digi-
tal sampling, should not be independent either. While the Bridgeport 
Music court later claimed to have taken a literal, hands-off approach 
to interpreting copyright law, reading differentiation into the stat-
utes inserts an unintended, judicially created standard. 
 Bridgeport Music holds that if pirating an entire song is infringe-
ment, then pirating a piece of a song is also infringement.140 This  
creates a more judicially efficient rule, as it establishes a bright-line 
rule; however, this bright-line rule ignores the obvious differences 
between a part of a song and an entire work. A part of a song can go 
virtually undetected and be irrelevant to the overall meaning of the 
original from which it was sampled.141 That part, even when placed 
in a new work, may go undetected as well. Admittedly, while the de-
tection of samples may be difficult or even impossible, that does not 
outweigh the benefit of protecting the original creative work of the 
artist or songwriter as intended by the copyright law. Regardless, as 
seen in Newton, there is a middle ground between no liability and 
strict liability.    
 What Bridgeport Music does offer that is of utmost importance is 
the decision to leave evolution of the rules to the sound recording 
market and those players in the music industry. The court not only 
stated that the ability of the music industry to easily determine ap-
propriate licensing fees is a reason for establishing a “[g]et a license 
or do not sample” rule,142 it also stated that if the industry does not 
like this rule, then it has the ability to change it.143 Typically, it is 
most efficient to allow the market for a particular good to determine 
both the appropriate price and the restrictions on access to the good. 
No doubt the music industry has the means and clout to create a 
sound recording licensing exchange system. However, this was not 
done with musical compositions; Congress created the compulsory li-
cense to keep songwriters from having monopoly-like private owner-
ship of their works under certain circumstances. In addition, the 
market for samples is the reverse of a typical market. The producer 
of the desired good (a song) does not produce for the purpose of sell-
ing his or her product in that market (samples market); the buyer (a 
sampling artist) decides that a particular product (existing song), or 
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piece of it, will improve his or her product (a new work including a 
sample). Basically, the buyers determine the sellers, as an original 
seller does not even exist as a seller in the samples market until the 
buyer decides what he or she wants. The record company of a sam-
pling artist may not be able to determine efficiently the price of the 
good (a sample) when it does not yet know what it needs, how much 
it needs, or how much value will actually be added by the sample. A 
record company on the other side does not know when its good (a 
sample) will be in demand or the value of a sample until the buyer is 
made known. 
 The above would lead to the conclusion that the music industry 
should then find a way to finesse Congress to create a similar com-
pulsory licensing structure for sound recordings, if so desired, to 
avoid inefficient market determinations. The problem is that the 
competing forces in copyright infringement cases are almost always 
parties with the same interests. In fact, a record company bringing 
an infringement claim in one case may be defending against a claim 
in another. Thus, the participants in the market are in conflict with 
themselves because in one instance they may want one type of strict, 
bright-line rule in order to be sure their copyright is protected, while 
in another they may want to see a more in-depth analysis in the 
hopes of getting away with using an unauthorized sample. Each side 
of the argument is actually a concentrated entity, giving it the ability 
to influence and benefit from a particular public choice; however, nei-
ther side is a diffuse group with the inability to influence or an indif-
ference to particular public choices. Regardless of the clout of the 
music industry and given the nature of the copyright infringement 
cases, it is irrational to wait for record companies, with fluctuating 
interests, to settle on the most efficient rule. 
V.   CONCLUSION: LAW AND ECONOMICS (RE)SOLUTION 
 The reality of the music industry is that digital sampling is 
cheaper and easier than creating replays of existing works. If the 
participants in the market act rationally, they will sample. Requiring 
permission at all times, as it stands today, is time-consuming and 
open to potential holdouts. The rational actor weighs the costs of cre-
ating replays and the cost of obtaining permission against the bene-
fits of each, which will result in having the desired sample but at a 
higher cost than unauthorized sampling. At the same time, the ra-
tional actor also weighs the costs and benefits of just sampling with-
out obtaining permission. If the probability of getting caught and 
having to pay a judgment or fine, or having to pay a license, or hav-
ing to just stop using a sample altogether does not decrease the bene-
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fit gained by the ease of digital sampling, artists will act rationally 
and continue to sample without first seeking consent. 
 Creative trade-offs result from either a strict enforcement of or a 
lenient approach to copyright law, in regard to digital sampling. Em-
bracing rules that restrict digital sampling, thus extending greater 
protections to copyright owners, creates greater costs for artists cre-
ating new works. Embracing a more lenient approach to digital sam-
pling and allowing new artists to sample at will creates greater costs 
for original artists seeking to protect their works. For example, the 
David Bowies and Queens of the music industry may be reluctant to 
create when the Vanilla Ices can use their creations with ease and 
without compensating the original artists for them; however, the 
2Pacs may not create if they cannot use the works of the Bruce 
Hornsbys without surmounting numerous hurdles and paying poten-
tially extortionate fees to do so. There is a cost-creativity trade-off to 
be made; more license-free rap equals less classic rock, but more 
tightly protected classic rock equals less rap. Despite any personal 
leanings, creativity is stifled either way, and that is contrary to the 
purposes of copyright law. Efficiency concerns seek a balance be-
tween the trade-offs. 
 Despite the hurdles that the music industry faces in establishing 
compulsory licensing, consideration should still be given to compul-
sory sampling licenses. Rather than seeking to apply a system for 
musical compositions to sound recordings and affecting all uses of 
sound recordings, Congress could simply apply a similar system to a 
completely separate use of musical works altogether. While this does 
not solve the problem of the sampling artist who chooses not to seek 
permission at all, the compulsory sampling license removes the guess 
work for those who do seek permission. They are assured of permis-
sion and, if implemented like the compulsory mechanical license, 
protected by the statutory rate cap. Just like the efficiency discussion 
of the compulsory mechanical license demonstrated, the structure of 
the music industry reduces anticommons problems, while the com-
pulsory license itself reduces the commons problem.  
 Given the law-and-economic analysis of the three cardinal digital 
sampling cases above, the solution is actually a resolution of the im-
plicit debate that exists between the cases themselves.  While bright-
line rules offer judicial efficiency, they inhibit creativity—contrary to 
the purposes of the copyright law—beyond whatever creativity they 
are meant to protect. Such opposition to bright-line rules would seem 
to eliminate any need for a Grand Upright Music rule of law; how-
ever, Grand Upright Music’s consolidation of sound recordings and 
musical compositions is where the analysis should begin.  Considera-
tion of sound recordings and musical compositions would seem to 
eliminate the beginning stages of both Newton and Bridgeport Music; 
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however, it is the recognition of the need for in-depth analysis in 
sound recordings, specifically, that provides the actual test that 
should be used.  Relying on sound recording analysis alone would 
seem to eliminate the need for Bridgeport Music; however, Bridge-
port Music’s acknowledgment of the need to recognize the exclusivity 
of each copyright ultimately gets us back in line with copyright law. 
 Law-and-economics analysis of digital sampling leads to the con-
clusion that infringement of both sound recordings and musical com-
positions should be evaluated based on de minimis determinations. 
Given the interdependent nature of these copyrights, a single analy-
sis could apply to both; however, given the nature of these copyrights 
as distinctly owned properties, this single analysis should also be ap-
plied separately for both copyrights. This separate-but-equal analysis 
does not permit the possession of one license to grant the use of the 
other copyright. Regardless of the common type of analysis applied, 
each copyright of a musical work should be licensed properly to avoid 
judicial analysis of that particular copyright in a litigation proceed-
ing. As such, a sampling artist that obtains a license for the musical 
composition, but not for the sound recording, is not automatically li-
able for copyright infringement and is also not off the hook. The court 
must still conduct the proper de minimis analysis to determine in-
fringement liability for the sound recording—and vice versa. 
 This resolution promotes the obtaining of licenses to avoid litiga-
tion altogether, and it also promotes settlement, if unauthorized use 
does occur, to avoid the uncertainty of litigation. It promotes the 
creative purposes of copyright law by protecting the creative works of 
original authors yet also allowing new authors to use existing works, 
up to that de minimis level, to create new works. It allows courts to 
balance the cost-creativity trade-off that occurs when digital sam-
pling is at issue. It allows the rationally acting sampling artists to do 
what they are going to naturally do anyway, within efficient legal pa-
rameters.  
